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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
circulation potential of a sensational trial to the interests of re-
sponsibility and fundamental fairness. To many commentators on
the problem, this fact has been the basis upon which to call
for positive restrictions upon the press. This call for action seems,
however, to be both futile, in constitutional terms, and unnecessary
in practical terms. Where the press is unwilling to exercise such
self-restraint, the trial court is inherently able to take steps calculated
to neutralize the effects of such press activity. As the Court pointed
out in Sheppard, criticism is too ofterf mistakenly directed at the
lack of remedies available to the trial court, and all too rarely at
the real problem, i.e., the failure of courts to insist upon their
effective use whenever necessary to preserve an accused's right to
a fair trial. Where their protection is effectively employed, the problem
of a non-conforming member of the news media can be effectively
solved. M
INjUiCTIONS - FEDERAL ANTI-INJUNCTION STATUTE - PRI-
VATE PARTY HELD "ExPREssLY AUTHoRIzED" By SECURITIES Ex-
CHANGE ACT TO SEEK STAY OF STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS.-
In an action brought by a corporation, a federal court enjoined
defendant-shareholder from utilizing stockholders' authorizations
which he had solicited and obtained in violation of the Securities
and Exchange Commission proxy regulations. Defendant was
attempting to make use of these authorizations in a New York State
court proceeding in which he sought to secure inspection of the
corporation's shareholder list. On appeal, defendant contended,
inter alia, that the injunction was issued in violation of the
federal anti-injunction statute. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, in affirming the district court, held, that in view of
the Securities Exchange Act provisions authorizing the Commission
to bring suit to restrain violations of its regulations, injunctive
relief sought by a private party for the same purpose was within
the "expressly authorized" exception of the anti-injunction statute.
Studebaker v. Gittlin, 360 F.2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966).
With the exception of the general limitations placed on the
federal judicial power by Article III, the federal constitution
does not 'prohibit the federal courts from enjoining actions in state
courts. In 1789, the Judiciary Act granted the federal courts a
general power to issue all writs.' Shortly thereafter, however,
Congress limited this power by providing that a writ of injunction
shall not be granted "to stay proceedings in any court of a state
.2 Although the legislative history of this act is somewhat
128 US.C § 1651 (1964).
2 Act of March 2, 1793,. cli. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 333.
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obscure,3 there has been no uncertainty as to the import of its
words.4
Despite the clear mandate of the act, exceptions threatened
to erode the effect of its proscription. In addition to several
recognized legislative exceptions to the act,5 the cases carved out
exceptions where both a federal and a state court attempted to
litigate the rights in a res already in the custody of the federal
court; 1 where the enforcement of fraudulently obtained state court
judgments was sought; 7 and, where the state courts were being
used in an attempted relitigation of a federal action.8
In 1941, however, the Supreme Court in Toucey v. New York
Life Ins. Co.,5 reversed the trend of judicially created exceptions
to the anti-injunction statute. Although the issue presented in
Toucey was limited to whether a federal court had the power
to stay proceedings in a state court when the matter had already
been adjudicated in a federal court, the Court took the opportunity
to comment extensively on the scope of the anti-injunction statute.')
It noted and seemed to accept the prevailing view that several
statutes passed by Congress subsequent to the anti-injunction statute
had amended it by implication IL (despite the fact that not all
of these statutes expressly authorized the enjoining of state court
actions by federal courts)." It was also made clear in Toucey
that the anti-injunction statute does not preclude the use of the
injunction to restrain state proceedings seeking to interfere with
property in the custody of the federal court. The Court then
stated that it chose not to discuss the other previous case-law
exceptions to the act, but implied that their value as precedent
was questionable. Finally, the Court reached the primary issue
and held that the federal courts may not enjoin a state proceeding
even to prevent relitigation of issues which had been previously
determined in a federal court.
3 See Barrett, Federal Injunctions Against Proceedings in State Courts,
35 CAMz. L. REv. 545 (1947); Durfee & Sloss, Federal Injunctions Against
Proceedings In State Courts: The Life History Of A Statute, 30 Mica.
L. Rev. 1145 (1932); Warren, Federal and State Court Interference,
43 HAgv. L. REv. 345, 348 (1930).4 Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 132 (1941).
5 E.g., Interpleader Act of 1926, 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1964); Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, 66 Stat. 422 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 29 (1964).
"Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U.S. 93 (1904).
7 Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915).8 Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Looney
v. Eastern Tex. IL, 247 U.S. 214 (1918).
9Supra note 4.20 Id. at 126.
1Id. at 132-34.
'2 See Note, Incompatabilitsj---The Touchstone Of Section 2283's Express
Authorization Exception, 50 Va. L. REv. 1404, 1408-10 (1964).
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Three years after its decision in Toucey, the Supreme Court,
in Bowles v. Willingham,13 was called upon to review the issue
of whether an injunction sought under the Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942 14 was an exception to the anti-injunction
mandate. In Bowles, a landlord had obtained a temporary in-
junction from a state court restraining the issuance of certain rent
orders by the Office of Price Administration. Thereafter, the
Administrator, pursuant to section 205 (a), brought suit in a federal
district court seeking to enjoin further prosecution of the state
court proceeding. Section 205(a) gave the Administrator the
general authority to seek injunctions but it made no mention of
the enjoining of state court proceedings. The Supreme Court
reversed the district court's refusal to issue the injunction and
held that the Emergency Price Control Act was an implied legislative
amendment to the anti-injunction statute. In what appeared to be
an alternate holding, the Court stated that since Congress pre-
empted jurisdiction in favor of the Emergency Court of Appeals,
to the exclusion of state courts, the rule expressed in the anti-
injunction statute was not applicable. Two years later, the Court
attempted to eradicate some of the uncertainty engendered by this
alternate holding. In Porter v. Dicken,15 involving a similar factual
situation, the Court explicitly stated that a provision for an applica-
tion for an injunction by the Price Administrator was an implied
legislative exception to the broad prohibition of the anti-injunction
statute, thereby eliminating the need for the "alternate" holding of
Bowles.'0
In 1948 Congress chose to re-enter the area of federal-state
interference by enacting Section 2283 of the United States Code,
the present "stay of state court proceedings" statute. Congress
provided that:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay pro-
ceedings in a state court except as expressly authorized by Act of Con-
gress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or
effectuate its judgnzwnts 7
13 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
4 Emergency Price Control Act, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 (1942).
15328 U.S. 252 (1946).
10 The Court stated that the alternate holding of Bowles was unnecessary
to support its decision. Supra note 15, at 255 n.1.
17 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964). (Emphasis added.) The statute of 1793
was re-enacted in the Revised Code of 1875, Rev. Stat. § 720 (1875),
and at that time an exception was added pertaining to bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. It was again enacted in 1911, Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231,§ 265, 28 U.S.C. § 379 (1940).
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The last of the three exceptions has created the least difficulty in
application.' 8  The legislative intent was generally understood
to restore the law as it appeared before the Toucey decision, i.e.,
a state court will be subject to a federal court injunction when
it entertains an action or proceeding concerning issues between
the parties which have been previously litigated in a federal court.' 9
In contrast to the above exception, the "expressly authorized"
and "in aid of its jurisdiction" exceptions to section 2283 have
caused enormous difficulties, both in interpretation and application.
The two most noteworthy cases which the Supreme Court has
decided in this area since the enactment of the present anti-
injunction statute are Capital Serv. Inc. v. NLRB 20 and A mal-
gamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Bros. Co.2
In Capital Service, a manufacturer obtained a state court in-
junction against a union which was picketing stores which sold
his product and, at the same time, filed a complaint with the
NLRB. The Board issued an unfair labor practice complaint
based on the union's conduct and obtained two injunctions in a
federal district court. The first enjoined any picketing by the
union pending final adjudication by the Board, and the other
enjoined Capital Service from enforcing the state court order. The
Supreme Court, in affirming the validity of the issuance of both
injunctions, held that the latter injunction lay within the "where
necessary in aid of its jurisdiction" exception to the anti-injunction
statute. The Court stated that where a federal court has already
assumed jurisdiction and
where Congress, acting within its constitutional authority, has vested
a federal agency with exclusive jurisdiction over a subject matter and
the intrusion of a state would result in conflict of functions, the federal
court may enjoin the state proceeding in order to preserve the federal
right 22
This case is to be contrasted with the ruling of the Supreme Court
in Richman, where the injunction was sought not by the NLRB,
but by a private party. An employer, without filing a complaint
with the NLRB, sought a state court injunction alleging common-
law conspiracy and restraint of trade. Thereafter, the union
18 Jacksonville Blow Pipe Co. v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 244
F2d 394 (5th Cir. 1957); Berman v. Denver Tramway Corp., 197 F.2d
946 (10th Cir. 1952); Jackson v. Carter Oil Co., 179 F.2d 524 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 812 (1950). But see Southern Cal. Petroleum
Corp. v. Harper, 273 F.2d 715 (5th Cir. 1960).
19 H.R. Rep. No. 308, at A 181-82. See Mooaz, CoexmETARY ON THE
JUDICEAL CODS 0.03 (49), at 410-11 (1949).20347 U.S. 501 (1954).
21348 U.S. 511 (1955).
22 Supra note 20, at 504.
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sought a federal district court injunction to discontinue the state
court proceedings, asserting that the matter was within the ex-
clusive jurisdiction of the NLRB. The Supreme Court held that
a private party's allegation of federal pre-emption will not be
sufficient to overcome the proscription of the anti-injunction statute.
The Court stated that while the Taft-Hartley Act authorizes the
NLRB to apply to a district court for injunctive relief in certain
cases, it does not "expressly authorize" private parties to do so.
In considering the "in aid of its jurisdiction" exception, which
had formed the basis for the holding in Capital Service, the Court
reasoned that since the district court had no jurisdiction until it
was invoked by the NLRB, "such nonexistent jurisdiction therefore
cannot be aided." 28 Thus, the state court action was allowed
to proceed undeterred by federal court intervention and the mandate
of the anti-injunction statute was followed.
In the instant case,2 4 defendant brought suit in a state court
to secure a copy of the corporation's stockholder list. Under New
York law, in order to obtain such a list from a foreign corporation,
a shareholder must receive written authorizations representing at
least five per cent of the outstanding stock.25  The defendant had ac-
quired a sufficient number of authorizations, but in so doing he violated
the SEC proxy rules regarding the pre-filing 2" of these solicitations
and their informational content.2 7 On the basis of these violations,
the plaintiff-corporation obtained an injunction in a federal district
court preventing defendant from making use of the authorizations
in the state court proceeding. On appeal, defendant contended,
inter alia, that the injunction was issued in violation of the anti-
injunction prohibition of section 2283.
In a carefully reasoned opinion, the Court held that the
injunction, when issued, did not violate section 2283 and that
defendant would not be allowed to make use of the written authori-
zations until such time as he complied with the SEC regulations.2
The Court first noted the Supreme Court's recent decision in
.. I. Case Co. v. Borak,29 which held that a stockholder may assert
23 Supra note 20, at 519.
24 Studebaker v. Gittlin, 360 F2d 692 (2d Cir. 1966).
25 N.Y. Bus. Con.'. LAW § 1315.
26 17 C.F.RL § 240.14a-6 (1964).
27 17 C.F.RL § 240.14a-3 (1964).
28 The state court in Gittlin v. Studebaker Corp., 49 Misc. 2d 964, 268
N.Y.S2d 897 (Sup. Ct. 1966), decided subsequent to the district court's
determination, held that despite the injunction, the plaintiff had a common-
law right to inspect the corporation's books without the authorizations.
The appellate division later reversed, holding that due to the federal
court's injunction the plaintiff could not solicit proxies and, hence, there
was no need for the plaintiff to see the stockholders list. Gittlin v. Stude-
baker Corp., 25 App. Div. 2d 822, 269 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1st Dep't 1966).
29377 U.S. 426 (1964).
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a derivative claim on behalf of the corporation based on a trans-
action proposed in an allegedly misleading proxy statement. The
Court in the instant case resolved that since a stockholder could
assert a derivative claim, then logically a corporation could bring
such a suit in its own behalf. The Court ruled that the authorizations
obtained were within the ambit of the proxy regulations, since
any letter which is part of "a continuous plan" intended to cul-
minate in proxy control, such as was the admitted intention of the
stockholder, directly involves the Commission rules.
After ascertaining that the shareholder violated the proxy
regulations and that plaintiff-corporation had standing to bring suit,
the Court reached the issue of the applicability of the anti-injunction
statute. In the main, it relied heavily upon Bowles v. Willingham 
30
and Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America v. Richman Bros.
Co.3 " The Court favorably compared the congressional policies
underlying the injunctive provisions of the Securities Exchange
Act,32 and the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, the statute
which formed the basis for the decision in Bowles. Both sections
provide for the general power to seek injunctions to prevent vio-
lations of the statute and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
Richman was cited as implying that orders sought by the NLRB
to restrain state court proceedings would fall within the "ex-
pressly authorized" exception to the anti-injunction statute. Pre-
sumably, the Court accepted the view that the combination of
exclusive federal jurisdiction, such as that of the NLRB, and
the broad power to seek injunctive relief was sufficient to overcome
the proscription of the statute.
On the basis of these Supreme Court decisions, the Court in
the instant case reasoned that if the SEC had attempted to enjoin
the use of the authorizations in the state court proceeding, the
injunction would have been readily issued.33  Relying on the
30 Supra note 13.
31 Supra note 21.
32 Compare materials at footnotes 13 and 14 mtpra, with the provisions
of the Securities Exchange Act. Section 21(e) of the act permits the
Securities and Exchange Commission to bring an action in any district court
of the United States to enjoin violations of the act. 63 Stat 107 (1949),
15 U.S.C. § 78u(e) (1964). "The SEC has, on its own, no statutory power
to compel the correction or prevent the use of materials violating the
proxy rules." Note, 31 U. Cm. L. Rmv. 328, 334 (1964). Section 14(a)
provides for the regulation of proxy solicitation. 48 Stat. 895 (1934),
15 U.S.C. § 78(n) (1964). If informal methods fail to secure compliance,
the SEC must look to the courts to enjoin the practices that violate the
act. It is clear that at the behest of the SEC, in a proper case, the
courts will enjoin the solicitation of proxies. See, e.g., SEC v. May,
229 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1956); SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 163 F.2d 511
(3d Cir. 1947); SEC v. O'Hara Re-election Comm., 28 F. Supp. 523
(D. Mass. 1939).23 Supra note 24, at 697-98.
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rationale of the Borak case, the Court concluded that, if a private
party may bring suit on the basis of the SEC proxy rules, and
the SEC would not have been prevented from obtaining injunctive
relief, a private party could seek a similar remedy.
If the policy of the anti-injunction statute is superseded by the need for
immediate and effective enforcement of federal securities regulations and
statutes, the fact that enforcement here is by a private party rather
than the agency should not be controlling.3 4
The Court ruled that the facts presented were sufficient to
bring the injunction within the scope of the "expressly authorized"
exception to the statute. However, there are several factors in the
case which seemingly cast doubt on the validity of this determina-
tion. The decision is based on the assumption that had the SEC
brought the suit, rather than a private party, the Court would
have been compelled under the cases construing the "expressly
authorized" exception to grant injunctive relief. This reasoning is
primarily premised on an inference made by the Supreme Court
in Richman that the combination of exclusive federal jurisdiction
and the general power to seek injunctive relief might have been
sufficient to constitute an "expressly authorized" exception to
the statute. Assuming, arguendo, that the inference drawn is
correct, the question remains whether or not the subject matter
of the instant case involved an area of exclusive federal jur-
isdiction. The answer would appear to be in the negative.
Under the Business Corporation Law of New York, Section
1315, a shareholder must obtain authorizations representing at least
five per cent of the outstanding stock in order to secure a stock-
holder list. Clearly, if New York wished to do so, it could reduce
this number to four per cent, three per cent or even zero per cent;
this is entirely the prerogative of the state and it may exercise
it at any time.3 - While it is true that in requesting the prerequisite
authorizations from the other shareholders, there was an incidental
violation of SEC rules, the fact persists that the main thrust of the
state court proceeding was the demand for a stockholders list.
The granting of access to such a list is not an area of exclusive
federal jurisdiction; rather, it is a right founded in the common
law of many states and only peripherally affected by their various
statutes.36  Therefore, the inference which has been drawn from
34 Sepra note 24, at 698.
3 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 3003; Miss. CODE ANN. § 1104 (1942).
36 Supra note 28. In regard to the confrontations between the various
state requirements and the Commission Rules, see Alabama Gas Corp. v.
Morrow, 265 Ala. 604, 93 So. 2d 515 (1957). The court there stated:
"It is our view that the provisions . . . which [make] it unlawful to
solicit proxies in contravention of the rules and regulations of the Securities
[ VOL. 41
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Richman, and so heavily relied on by the Court in Gittlin for its
conclusion that the SEC could have successfully maintained a re-
quest for injunctive relief, appears to be inapplicable since the
subject matter did not involve an area of exclusive federal
jurisdiction.
In addition, the fact that a private party, and not the Com-
mission, brought suit should have been considered controlling. It
is true that the Supreme Court in Borak indicates that a private
party, as a general rule, has the right to enforce the Securities
Exchange Act and the regulations thereunder. However, Borak
should not have been extended to the proposition that a private
party should be able to effectively restrain state court proceedings
involving a relatively minor infraction of the SEC regulations.
After a complaint has been filed, the Commission has the re-
sponsibility, in its discretion, for deciding whether the relief
requested by the complaining party should be pursued.37 It would
seem that even the most flagrant violation of the act might, in the
discretion of the Commission, be allowed to continue where it
was not in effect causing any substantial harm or was not
at variance with the national interest. Indeed, the failure of
the Commission to act after due deliberation has been construed
by the courts in several instances to mean that the infraction was
not of sufficient import to warrant the relief requested. 3  Since
a proxy fight generally involves a bitter contest between groups
who have substantial financial interests at stake,3" perhaps the
best solution would be to allow only the SEC to seek injunctive
relief when it becomes necessary in the opinion of its staff of
experts.
The usual procedure under the Securities Exchange Com-
mission rules is for the party seeking relief to lodge a complaint
with the Commission. Hearings are held wherein the Commission
and Exchange Commission . . . should not be construed as depriving a
stockholder of rights [under the Alabama stuatute] which . . . [statute]
does not in any way relate to the manner of soliciting proxies. We do
not consider it to be a defense to the instant proceeding, which merely
seeks to obtain the names of stockholders, that the proxies and accompanying
material which may be hereafter sent out to stockholders may have to
comply with the rules and regulations of the Securities and Exchange
Commission." Alabama Gas Corp. v. Morrow, supra at 607, 93 So. 2d
at 518.
37 Pierce v. SEC, 239 F.2d 160, 163 (9th Cir. 1956). "The Commission
is given the duty to protect the public. What will protect the public
must involve, of necessity, an exercise of discretionary determination.
This Court ordinarily should not substitute its judgment of what would
be appropriate under the circumstances in place of the Commission'sjudgment as to measures necessary to protect the public interest."
38 Kauder v. United Bd. & Carbon Corp., 199 F. Supp. 420, 423-
44 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).39 Mack v. Mishkin, 172 F. Supp. 885, 886 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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investigates the charges made. Then the Commission, in its
discretion, may bring suit in the district court for injunctive
relief. Presumably, private parties who do not wish to wait for
the SEC to act, can now, under this decision, go directly to a
district court to obtain injunctive relief against a state court
proceeding. It can be argued that this is the better result. Mere
staff deficiencies in the investigative processes may cause the Com-
mission to delay in instituting action on its own where injunctive
relief is needed. Also, the Commission may be hesitant to seek an
injunction against a state court proceeding. Advocates of allowing
private litigants to seek injunctive relief against state court pro-
ceedings directly in the federal courts, point out that permitting
such actions will supplement the enforcement efforts of the SEC.
This theory rests on the ground that "an individual claiming a
violation on the part of an adversary in a proxy contest who could
not convince the SEC to bring an action would have no redress
if the private action were disallowed."4" If recognition of a
private action under Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
rests on a conception of the private party helping the SEC to enforce
the act, then the remedies afforded the private party should
be the same as those available to the SEC.
Nevertheless, the SEC's expertise should be controlling in a
situation such as that in the instant case where the alleged violation
pertained only to the pre-filing and informational content re-
quirements. The pre-filing requirements are in essence a mere
formality. Because of the large number of such applications re-
ceived each year by the Commission, they are generally subjected to
only a superficial examination.41 In cases such as this, where there
is a simple request for a written authorization to examine the share-
holders list, there appears to be insufficient reason to adhere to the
strict formality of informational content found in a proxy request.
Perhaps where a more substantial question is involved where the
Commission's inaction would be tantamount to an abuse of dis-
cretion, an injunction sought in the federal district courts might
be justifiable, but not on facts such as these.
The Court also relied on Bowles, but this decision appears dis-
tinguishable from the instant case. In Bowles, the federal agency
sought the injunction in order to protect a government policy of
great national interest and importance, i.e., the enforcement of
price restraints during a period of crisis. In the instant case,
no national interest was involved and a private party sought the
injunction. In addition, it was recognized in the instant case
40 Note, 31 U. CHL L. REV. 328, 337 (1964).
41 See Armstrong, The Role of the Securities and Exchange Com-
inission in Proxy Contests of Listed Companies, 11 Bus. LAw. 110, 122(1955).
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that the proscription of the anti-injunction statute is at its strongest
where only the interests of private parties are involved."2
The Court in the instant case, finding that the litigation came
within the "expressly authorized" exception to section 2283, never
reached the question whether the case might fall within the "in
aid of its jurisdiction" exception. It appears that it would not,
since in regard to this exception, it has been the long recognized
legislative intent "to make clear the recognized power of the
Federal courts to stay proceedings in State cases removed to the
district courts."4 3
However, the related problem in the instant case is whether
a federal court may grant an injunction, not in aid of its own
jurisdiction, but rather in aid of the jurisdiction of a federal
agency. The "in aid of its jurisdiction" exception is one that
has been narrowly construed " and, if applied in the instant case,
would provide an unjustifiable extension. Although in Capital
Service the Court supported the injunction in aid of its jurisdiction,
the facts are distinguishable from the instant case. In Capital
Service, the Court granted one injunction restraining the union's
picketing and another enjoining the petitioner from enforcing the
state court injunction. The injunction was necessitated by the
fact that an apparent conflict would exist between two outstanding
injunctions. If the federal court was to have unfettered power
to issue appropriate relief it had to be freed of all restraints
by the other tribunal, but in the instant case there was no apparent
conflict between the federal and state courts. The Court's issuance
of an injunction would not aid the jurisdiction of the SEC or
of the federal court. The Court has not assumed jurisdiction
over the primary issues litigated in the state court but merely
asserts that certain authorizations, incidental to a state action to
obtain the corporation's shareholder list, were procured illegally.
The third exception to the applicability of the anti-injunction
statute, viz., the provision made for the protection of federal judg-
ments, is also inappropriate, since it is considered applicable only
when there is a prior federal judgment.
The passage of the anti-injunction statute was clearly meant
to be a reiteration of the prior statute plus a codification of judicial
precedent prior to Toucey. If a case does not come within one
of the statutory exceptions, it seems that a federal court may not
issue an injunction which will interfere with a state court
proceeding. Since the instant case does not appear to come within
any of the statutory exceptions, it is, in effect, a judicially added
exception in violation of the restrictive policy of Congress.
42Snpra note 24, at 697.
4 Supra note 19.
44T. Smith & Son, Inc. v. Williams, 275 F.2d 397, 407 (5th Cir.
1960).
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Proceedings deemed to be exclusively within the ambit of state
jurisdiction should not be interfered with by a federal injunction
premised solely on grounds not germane to the issues litigated. In-
stead, parties should be encouraged to exhaust state remedies before
availing themselves of the aid of a federal court. This decision, if
generally followed, would tend only to promote federal-state clashes
rather than implement the explicit policy of the anti-injunction
statute which is to avoid such conflict.
A
TAXATION - ESTATE TAXES - WHERE GRANTOR HAS PowER
TO ACCUMULATE TRUST INCOME SUCH INCOME IS TAXABLE TO His
ESTATE. - The grantor of a trust, as cotrustee, bad the power to dis-
tribute or accumulate trust income. The executors brought a refund
action after the Commissioner of Internal Revenue included in
grantor-decedent's gross estate both the original trust corpus and
the accumulated income arising from the principal. In reversing
the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the
United States Supreme Court held that income accumulated pur-
suant to the exercise of the grantor's power, in addition to the
original transfer of trust property, constituted a taxable transfer
within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code. United States
v. O'Malley, 383 U.S. 627 (1966).
Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954' and its predecessor,2
a decedent's gross estate for estate tax purposes includes the value
of all property of which a transfer3 by trust or otherwise has been
made under any of the following circumstances: (1) the transfer
is in contemplation of death;4 (2) the transfer is subject to
certain retained5 life interests ;6 (3) the transfer is intended to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the grantor's
IINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§2035(a), 2 036(a), 2037(a), 2038(a)(1),(2).
2Int. Rev. Code of 1939, §§ 811(c) (1), 811(d) (1).
3 Such a transfer does not include "a bona fide sale for an adequate and
full consideration in money or money's worth." INT. Rsv. CoDs OF 1954,
§ 2035(a), 2036(a), 2037(a), 2038(a) (1), (2).
4 It should be noted that a gift in contemplation of death, for Code
purposes, is not necessarily one arising from Ia reasonable fear that death is
near at hand. . . . It is sufficient if contemplation of death be the inducing
cause of the transfer whether or not death is believed to be near." United
States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, 109 (1930).
5 The retained power must be for the transferor's life "or for any period
not ascertainable without reference to his death br for any period which
does not in fact end before his death." INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 2036(a).
6 The interests retained are either
(1) The possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income
from, the property, or
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